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Article
"Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium" - Sed Non
Hodie:*
Bandoni v. State of Rhode Island, a
Ten Year Retrospective.
Marty C. Marran"
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 1998 the opinion in Bandoni v. State of Rhode
Island,1 was handed down by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Now, some ten years later, it continues to astound the mind and
shock the collective conscience of those deeply concerned not only
with the rights of crime victims in Rhode Island, but more
importantly, with the Supreme Court's exceedingly myopic view of
its own power and function as the protector of the State
Constitution and of the sacred rights enumerated therein. That
day marked the utter demise of Article I, Section 23 of the Rhode
* "Where there is a right, there is a remedy "...but not today.
Dedicated to Joseph E. Marran Jr., Esq. (1923-2003) Consummate
advocate, father, mentor.., friend.
"[m]astering the lawless science of our law,
that codeless myriad of precedent,
that wilderness of single instances"
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, A YLMER'S FIELD (1793)
1. 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998).
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Island Constitution, the "Crime Victim's Rights Amendment,"
enacted a scant twelve years before. In a four-to-one decision the
Supreme Court abrogated any and all effective means of enforcing
that Amendment, and in so doing it shamefully surrendered its
own supreme judicial authority to the State Legislature. That day
has now passed into Rhode Island's judicial history, but as the late
composer Irving Berlin once musically noted: "The Song Is Ended
(But the Melody Lingers On.").
Only one Justice dissented. 2 He did so most heroically and
with an eloquence far surpassing the meager abilities of this
writer. At the outset it is urged that the opinion and dissent
should be read carefully and in total, that the reader might better
appreciate the significance of the opinions and hopefully, the
importance of devising a means by which the Crime Victim's
Amendment may yet be revived and restored.
This article will begin with a discussion of the first count of
the Bandonis' complaint sounding in negligence. Thereafter,
discussion will turn to the concept of the constitutional tort,
addressing the steps used by the courts in determining whether a
law or constitutional provision is "self executing" and the
ramifications of such a finding. Next, the corresponding decisions
in the Federal forum will be reviewed and examined insofar as
they may serve as a guide to the state courts which find
themselves confronted with these issues. It will then turn to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 874 A and its provision for
the implementation of existing remedies and/or the creation of a
new remedy by the courts. Finally, discussion will be had as to the
practical means of reinstating crime victims' rights to the status
originally intended by the framers.
II. THE FACTS OF BANDONI 3
On the evening of August 1, 1992, the Appellant Robert J.
Bandoni was operating a motorcycle in the Town of Coventry with
his wife, Appellant Lorraine Bandoni, as his passenger when they
2. Id. at 601 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
3. The following facts are provided to allow for an understanding of the
factual background and procedural posture of the case. A more detailed
factual travel is laid out in the text of the opinion in Bandoni, 715 A.2d at
582-83.
596 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:594
were broad-sided by a pick-up truck operated by Robert L.
Richardson, Jr.4 Lorraine Bandoni was fortunately thrown clear
and suffered only minor injuries. 5  Robert Bandoni suffered
extensive injuries, including a crushed left leg and pelvis. 6
Richardson was arrested at the scene and a chemical test of his
breath revealed that he had been operating his vehicle at the time
of the accident with a blood alcohol level more than twice the legal
limit. 7
Although Lorraine accompanied Robert in the ambulance, she
first gave the investigating officers a brief statement and contact
information at the scene of the accident. She later went to the
Coventry Police Station and gave a more detailed statement on
August 5, 1992.8 At that time she requested that she and Mr.
Bandoni be kept apprised of the case against Richardson. 9 She
assured the police officer with whom she spoke of their full
cooperation in any further investigation and in the prosecution. 10
On August 21, 1992, Richardson was arraigned in the Third
Division District Court on the charge of driving while
intoxicated. 11 Thereafter, on September 23, 1992 at a pretrial
conference, Richardson was allowed to plead nolo contendere to a
reduced charge.12 He was sentenced to one year's unsupervised
probation, and was required to pay a two-hundred fifty dollar
contribution to the highway fund and court costs. 13 Neither
Robert nor Lorraine ever received notice of the arraignment or
pre-trial date, and neither was ever advised as to their rights as
the victims of Richardson's crime. 14 In fact, they only learned
about the disposition of Richardson's case some thirty days
thereafter upon the inquiry of private counsel they had retained to
4. Id. at 582-83.
5. Id. at 583.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Bandonis' rights as victims are codified in the Rhode Island
Constitution. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-28-1
(1956), et seq.
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bring a civil claim against him. 15
III. TRAVEL OF THE CASE
Mr. And Mrs. Bandoni first filed a claim against the Town of
Coventry with the Town Council on December 29, 1994, arguing
town officials disregarded their constitutional and statutory rights
by failing to advise them of their rights as crime victims. 16 Upon
rejection of their claim by the town council, they immediately filed
their Verified Complaint in the Kent County Superior Court. The
Defendants, municipal and state, were duly served and notice of
the action was served upon the Attorney General, who entered his
appearance on behalf of the State of Rhode Island, its agents,
servants and employees; private counsel entered on behalf of the
Town of Coventry, its agents, servants and employees. 17
Plaintiffs once amended their Verified Complaint as a matter of
right, and the defendants thereafter moved jointly to dismiss,
asserting that the Amended Verified Complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. The trial justice ordered
the dismissal of the Amended Verified Complaint. Thereupon, an
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
IV. THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN BANDONI
The Appeal presented two issues to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court; issue one presented the question:
Will a negligence action lie against the State of Rhode
Island, a municipality and/or the respective agents,
servants and employees of each, the latter also in their
individual capacities, upon the negligent failure of those
defendants, or any of them, to perform the duties set
forth in R.I. Const., Art. I, sec 23, Rights of victims of
crime, and or General Laws Sec. 9-31-1, et seq. Victims'
rights, where such negligence results in actual and
15. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583.
16. The Bandonis' claim was made in accordance with R.I. GEN. LAWS §
45-15-5.
17. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-9-6 provides that the attorney General "shall
appear for and defend the . . . legislators, boards, divisions, departments,
commissions, commissioners, and officers, in all suits and proceedings which
may be brought against them in their official capacity."
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measurable damages to the plaintiffs? 18
while issue two asked whether:
In the absence of any adequate existing civil remedy for
the alleged violation of the statutory and/or constitutional
rights of individuals identified as the victims of crime, is
such a remedy appropriate in furtherance of the purpose
of General Laws Sec. 12-28-1, et seq., and/or R.I. Const.,
Art I, sec 23 and necessary to assure their effectiveness,
and will such a right of action as claimed by these
plaintiffs, or "constitutional tort," so-called, now be
judicially recognized or created by this Honorable Court
in order to provide redress for the deprivation of these
rights? 19
A. Issue I - The Negligence Action
It must be acknowledged first that there was no common law
right of action against the sovereign, 20 and that such right of
action as against the State of Rhode Island and the Town of
Coventry arises, if at all, upon the statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity contained in General Laws Section 9-31-1, et seq. That
section provides:
The state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision
thereof, including all cities and towns, shall, subject to
the period of limitations set forth in § 9-1-25, hereby be
liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a
private individual or corporation; provided, however, that
any recovery in any such action shall not exceed the
monetary limitations thereof set forth in the chapter. 21
Furthermore, a victim or victims of crime had no individual
"rights" under American common law with respect to their active
participation in any particular stage of the criminal process; the
protection of their interests was entrusted to the judiciary and
those charged with the investigation and prosecution of criminal
18. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583-84.
19. Id.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1979) (providing that a
State is not subject to suit without its consent).
21. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-31-1 (2002).
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offenses. 22 However, the cause of action stated in Count I does
not emanate from the Victims' Rights statute; it emanates from
the law of negligence.
In Bandoni the plaintiffs alleged: (1) that they were at all
times relevant thereto the identified victims of a crime; (2) that as
the victims of crime they were owed certain and specific duties by
the state and municipal defendants under the statutes and the
constitution; (3) that the defendants each and all negligently
failed to perform these duties; (4) that as a direct and proximate
result the plaintiffs were permanently deprived of their statutory
and constitutional rights, inter alia, to address the District Court
prior to the acceptance of the criminal defendant's plea bargain
and sentencing as to the impact of his crime against them; and (5)
that they were thus injured. 23 In so doing they set forth that
which was urged to be an actionable negligence claim:
The Bandonis argue that they have established a prima
facie case of common law negligence by demonstrating
that both the Victim's Bill of Rights legislation and the
victims' rights constitutional amendment place
affirmative duties on defendants to apprise crime victims
of their rights. The Bandonis contend that defendants'
inexcusable failure to comply with these duties
constitutes a breach requiring monetary damages to
compensate them for their injuries. We do not agree.
Among the statutory rights allegedly violated were G.L.
1956 §§
"12-28-3. General rights -- (a) *
To be informed by the prosecuting officer of the right
to request that restitution be an element of the final
disposition of the case."
22. While private prosecution, no doubt, flourished in colonial times, by
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the concept of public prosecution
was firmly established in place in the majority of the states. See Andrew
Sidman, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754,
763 (1975) (discussing the development of the American system of public
prosecution).
23. Brief of Appellant Bandonis at 1, Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I.
1998) (No. 95-563).
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"12-28-4.1. Right to address court regarding plea
negotiation -
(a) Prior to acceptance by the court of a plea
negotiation and imposition of sentence upon a
defendant who has pleaded nolo contendere or guilty
to a crime, the victim of the criminal offense shall,
upon request, be afforded the opportunity to address
the court regarding the impact which the defendant's
criminal conduct has had upon the victim."
"12-28-4.3. Pretrial Conferences -- Misdemeanors
in district court. -
In all misdemeanor cases heard before the district
court, the victim of the alleged criminal offense shall
be afforded the opportunity to address the court
during the pretrial conference * * *. At the pretrial
conference, the victim shall be afforded the
opportunity to explain the impact which the
defendant's criminal conduct has had upon the victim
and to comment on the proposed disposition of the
case."
"12-28-5.1. Restitution. -
When the court orders a defendant to make financial
restitution to the victim of a crime of which the
defendant has been convicted or to which the
defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, a
civil judgment shall automatically be entered by the
trial court against the defendant on behalf of the
victim for that amount."24
The opinion then went on to report that the Bandonis had
conceded as fact that none of these rights existed at common law;
the court also acknowledged that it has 'long held . . . that the
creation of new causes of action is a legislative function."' 25
24. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583-84.
25. Id. at 584 (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc., v. Marathon House,
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Therefore, the opinion concluded, because the General Assembly
had failed to provide a remedy, the:
"principles of judicial restraint prevent us from creating a
cause of action where a duty to apprise crime victims of
their rights did not exist at common law and where our
Legislature has neither by express terms nor by
implication provided for civil liability . .. (A) cause of
action for damages does not lie in negligence(.)" 26
In answer, one might consider, for instance, that the
principles of "restitution" and "right to redress" certainly existed
at common law long before the Victim's Rights statute was
enacted. In fact, many of the provisions of that statute are "new"
only in instance, and reflect values and principles espoused for
centuries in our common law tradition. Count I of the Bandonis'
complaint asked only that these principles be recognized and
acted upon by the Court that it might reverse the Rule 12 (b) (6)
dismissal of the common-law negligence action and remand the
case for trial:
Unlike some other states, in Rhode Island the violation of
a statute is not conclusive evidence, nor does it create a
presumption of a violation of a duty of care or relieve a
jury of finding a breach of such a duty. However, in this
state a statutory violation can be considered by the fact-
finder as evidence of negligence when the plaintiff
demonstrates that he or she is a person whom the statute
was designed to protect . . . and that the harm that
occurred was the kind of harm the statute was designed
to prevent. 27
While judges over the centuries have in their discretion
allowed crime victims the opportunity directly to address the
court, there is no opinion, decision or dictum, at least none in
recent history, from which it could be concluded that crime victims
were afforded such opportunities as a matter of right at common
law. Yet, the reader might look back to the days in England and
Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)).
26. Id. at 585.
27. Id. at 628 (Flanders, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
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Colonial America when it was for the crime victim himself, his
family, friends and neighbors to apprehend the perpetrator and
bring him to trial before the magistrate and "prosecute" the
complaint at a public trial where all had notice and those who
wished were in attendance. 28 Also, in cases where an accomplice
was found to have assisted somehow in the perpetrator's escape,
that accomplice was held to answer as if he was the principal. 29
These traditions may be said to survive in the (albeit modified)
form of citizens' arrest, 30 private criminal complaint, 31 and the
right to seek "restitution."32 Where an employee of the state or
municipality has negligently or willfully deprived a crime victim of
his common law right to seek restitution or otherwise enjoy the
opportunity to participate in, or at least witness a proceeding
arising out of the offense against him, should not that employee
and his principal now be substituted for the perpetrator and held
to answer to the victim?
When one examines the common law history, rather than say
that these "rights" never existed, it is more correctly stated that
the vindication of a crime victim's rights was traditionally
entrusted, again, to the judiciary and to the prosecuting
authorities rather than to the crime victim himself. Our Rhode
Island Supreme Court has held:
(W)here the case is new in principle, the courts have no
authority to give a remedy, no matter how great the
grievance; but where the case is only new in instance, and
the sole question is upon the application of a recognized
28. See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 359-365 (1986) (discussing the history of private
prosecutions in England); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 5-
7, 304-05, 308-12 (1769) (describing the English system of private
prosecutions); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 86 (J.P. Mayer
& M. Lerner, eds. 1966) (noting that in colonial America, "the officers of the
public prosecutor's office are few, and the initiative in prosecutions is not
always theirs.").
29. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 35 (1769).
30. Rhode Island has codified the common law right to citizens arrest at
R.I.G.L. § 12-7-16 (1956).
31. Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 871 (R.I. 2001) ("private
misdemeanor prosecutions, initiated by complaints filed by a private citizen,
long have been a part of Rhode Island criminal law.)
32. Rhode Island Courts are permitted to require both private and public
restitution (community service) pursuant to G.L. § 12-19-32.
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principle to a new case, 'it will be just as competent for
courts of justice to apply the principle to any case that
may arise two centuries hence as it was two centuries
ago.' 33
Further discussion as to the available "defenses" to the
Bandonis' complaint would be moot since the case was dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6). Nonetheless, it appears from the facts of this
case that none of the common law defenses, 34 the various
immunities 35 and the so-called 'public duty doctrine' could
successfully be interposed. 3 6 Moreover, most - if not all - of the
'list of awfuls' recited by the defendants, and by the majority
opinion -the prospect of crime victims suing prosecutors, defense
lawyers and judges - is no more than a chimera. It was never
suggested to the Court that any of the recognized immunities
would be cast off in this or any other such action.
B. Issue II -The Constitutional Tort
In the absence of any adequate existing civil remedy for
the alleged violation of the statutory and/or constitutional
rights of individuals identified as the victims of crime, is
33. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 101 (R.I. 1910) (internal citations
omitted).
34. In Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896, 896 (R.I. 1970), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court abrogated the common law doctrine of municipal immunity.
35. Traditionally, an individual tortiously injured by an agent of the
state or one of its political subdivisions was barred from recovery by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. See WILLIAM LLYOD PROSSER & W. PAGE
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 131 at 1032 (5th ed.1984). As our Supreme
Court has observed "the rationale for this rule stems from a common-law
theory thoroughly rejected by the American people under King George III,
namely, that 'The King Can Do No Wrong.' Since 1957 the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions have either limited or repudiated the doctrine of
sovereign immunity by court decision or legislative fiat." Catone v. Medberry,
555 A.2d 328, 330 (R.I. 1989). Consistent with that trend the Rhode Island
the General Assembly statutorily abolished the doctrine of sovereign
immunity against the state in 1970 with the enactment of the Governmental
Tort Liability Act, R.I. Gen Laws § 9-31-1 (1985 Reenactment) (as enacted by
P.L. ch. 181, § 2 (1970)).
36. "[The public-duty doctrine shields the state and its political
subdivisions from tort liability "arising out of discretionary governmental
actions that by their nature are not ordinarily performed by private persons."
Houle v. Galloway School Lines, Inc., 643 A.2d 822 (R.I. 1994) (quoting Haley
v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992).
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such a remedy appropriate in furtherance of the purpose
of General Laws Sec. 12-28-1, et seq., and/or R.I. Const.,
Art I, sec 23 and necessary to assure their effectiveness,
and will such a right of action as claimed by these
plaintiffs, or "constitutional tort," so-called, now be
judicially recognized or created by this Honorable Court
in order to provide redress for the deprivation of these
rights? 37
The traditional common law remedies recited above are
roundabout and wholly inadequate to the task of addressing the
wrong done to the Bandonis. The state constitution belongs to all
Rhode Island citizens, and when any citizen suffers the
abridgment of a specified constitutional right as a result of the
tortious acts of the sovereign, its agents, servants and employees,
that citizen should be entitled to seek redress and to be
compensated for the specific injury done him. Where there is no
adequate remedy presently recognized, it is incumbent upon the
Supreme Court to examine the state constitution, to determine
whether or not the constitutional provision in question is self-
executing, and if so, to accord recognition to the existence of a
direct cause of action thereunder, or "constitutional tort. ' 38
Moreover, it is always within the sound discretion of the court
whether such a direct action is necessary to effectuate the
provision and to further its purpose, and then to create such an
action. 39 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, 'The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.' 0 Likewise "where a constitution asserts a
certain right, or lays down a certain principle of law or procedure,
it speaks for the entire people as their supreme law, and is full
authority for all that is done in pursuance of its provisions."4 1The
Rhode Island Constitution provides:
A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by
37. Brief of Appellant Bandonis at 1, Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I.
1998) (No. 95-563).
38. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 585-86.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).
40. Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
41. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900).
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agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity
during all phases of the criminal justice process. Such
person shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of
the crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss
caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive
such other compensation as the state may provide.
Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to
address the court regarding the impact which the
perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim.42
Although the corresponding state statute is more specific and
detailed with respect to these victims' rights,43 it must be
remembered that the statute was enacted some three years prior
to the adoption of Article 1, Section 23. It cannot be said to be an
"enabling act" or legislation specifically designed to implement
this constitutional provision. As will be shown, this constitutional
amendment was, in fact, drawn by the framers in response to that
which they perceived to be an inherent defect in the statute: the
lack of an enforcement provision. Since the constitutional
amendment of 1986, the General Assembly has not amended the
Victim's Rights section to provide crime victims a cause of action
arising out of the deprivation of their rights, but this fact should
not have been determinative of the issue. Where the
constitutional provision in question may be found to be self-
executing, no action by the legislature is required to give it full
force and effect "[t]he absence of legislative enabling statutes
cannot be construed to nullify rights provided by the constitution
if those rights are sufficiently specified. ' 44 The first question is
whether this provision is self-executing. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the proper approach to
constitutional interpretation:
Our task in construing constitutions is to give effect to
the intent of the framers. In so doing, we employ the
well-established rule of construction that when words in
the constitution are free of ambiguity, they must be given
their plain, ordinary and usually accepted meaning.
42. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23.
43. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 12-28-1 - 12-28-13 (2002).
44. See Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 927 (Vt. 1995).
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Every clause of the constitution must given its due force,
meaning, and effect, and no word or section can be
assumed to have been unnecessarily used or needlessly
added...
In construing a constitutional provision, this court
properly consults extrinsic sources, including the
proceedings of constitutional conventions and any
legislation related to the constitutional provision that was
enacted at or near the time of the adoption of the
constitutional amendment. And finally, in our
examination of the constitution, we must look to the
history of the times and examine the state of affairs as
they existed when the constitution was framed and
adopted. 45
The Rhode Island Constitution mandates that "[e]very person
within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse
to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in
one's person, property, or character."46  However, it is not
suggested that this provision is, in and of itself, the source of any
new substantive right or cause of action. It has been said in
paraphrase of the section that there is no wrong without a
remedy, but it is equally true that there can be no actionable
wrong unless there is a corresponding right vested otherwise in
the party seeking redress. Even if crime victims' rights were not
known at common law, those rights are now clearly established by
the Rhode Island Constitution's Article I, Section 23, that is, until
the decision in Bandoni.
V. THE "TROUBLING RAMIFICATIONS"' 47 OF THE DECISION
By means of the Court's decision in this case the
constitutional right of crime victims to address the court before
sentencing of the criminal who injured them "regarding the
impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim,"
45. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995) (internal
citations omitted).
46. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
47. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 602 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
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has been judicially emasculated. 48 "As a result, a right that our
Constitution declares to be "essential and unquestionable," has
been rendered nonessential and questionable; a right that our
Constitution decrees is to be "established, maintained and
preserved," has been disestablished, dismembered and disserved;
and a right that our Constitution proclaims to be "of paramount
obligation in all . . . judicial ... proceedings," has been judicially
subordinated to a vision of legislative hegemony over the
protection of constitutional rights. '49
Article I, Section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution
unequivocally guarantees all persons access to the judicial process
no matter what the source of the right to be vindicated. 50
Whereas the law will provide a remedy for every wrong, it cannot
be gainsaid that the law will provide a remedy for the abridgment
of these crime victims' constitutional rights. As was stated by the
Vermont Supreme Court in its decision to recognize the right of
direct action under its state constitution, "(t)o deprive individuals
of a means by which to vindicate their constitutional rights would
negate the will of the people in ratifying the constitution, and
neither this Court nor the Legislature has the power to do so."51
The Vermont Court continued:
In determining whether a constitutional provision is self-
executing, most jurisdictions have measured their
constitutions against the standard adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Davis v. Burke:
"A constitutional provision may be said to be self-
executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of
which the right given may be enjoyed and protected.
and it is not self-executing when it merely
indicates principles, without laying down rules by
means of which those principles may be given the
force of law . . ." In short, if complete in itself, it
48. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23
49. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 602 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
50. See Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195, 197-201
(R.I. 1984).
51. Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 928 (Vt. 1995).
608 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:594
executes itself. '52
Further elaborating on this standard, The Vermont Supreme
Court emphasized that:
Determining whether a provision supplies a sufficient
rule entails application of certain relevant criteria, no one
of which is dispositive. First, a self-executing provision
should do more than express only general principles; it
may describe the right in detail, including the means for
its enjoyment and protection. Ordinarily a self-executing
provision does not contain a directive to the legislature
for further action. The legislative history may be
particularly informative as to the provision's intended
operation. Id. Finally, a decision for or against self-
execution must harmonize with the scheme of rights
established in the constitution as a whole. 53
The first sentence of Article I, Section 23 states that "[a]
victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of
the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of
the criminal justice process." 54  Applying the first of the
aforementioned criteria, it would appear that this sentence is only
meant to be a general statement of fundamental principle; it
specifies no particular "right" or any means by which it should be
enjoyed or protected. Standing alone, this expression does not
appear to give rise to that which may be called an "enforceable" or
"actionable" right against the state or its agents.
However, Article I, sec.23 must be read as a whole. The
remaining two sentences do provide very specific rights to the
crime victim. These sentences provide that:
"[s]uch person shall be entitled to receive, from the
52. 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900) (citation omitted). Cf. State v. Sanabria, 474
A.2d 760, 770-75 (Conn. 1984) (analyzing whether a state constitutional
amendment was self-executing); Clausing v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
271 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("It is true that the constitutional
provision protecting the right of privacy ... is self-executing and supports a
cause of action for an injunction."); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So.2d 846, 851 (Fla.
1960) ("The fact that the right granted by [a] provision may be supplemented
by legislation, further protecting the right or making it available, does not of
itself prevent the provision from being self-executing.").
53. Shields, 658 A.2d at 928 (internal citations omitted).
54. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23
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perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any
injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and
shall receive such other compensation as the state may
provide, before sentencing, a victim shall have the right
to address the court regarding the impact which the
perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim." 55
As a whole then, article I, section 23 unequivocally expresses
much more than abstract truisms. It sets forth the specific right
to receive financial compensation from the perpetrator of the
crime. It sets forth the right to such compensation as the state
may provide. Most importantly, it sets forth the specific right to
address the court regarding the impact which the criminal's
conduct has had upon the victim. This amendment contains no
direction whatsoever for the General Assembly to act, and the
rights that are guaranteed thereby are not dependent on any
legislative provision, past, present or future.
Upon examination of the minutes and other records of the
1986 Constitutional Convention it appears that they do offer
guidance as to the intended effect of article 1, section 23.56 There
were three resolutions before the Judiciary Committee relative to
victim's rights, that which was selected was numbered Resolution
86-00140, which, after debate was sent to the convention and after
approval, to the Committee on Style and Drafting in the following
form:
All persons within this state who are victims of crime
shall, as a matter of right be treated with dignity, respect
and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice
process. Whenever possible, such person shall receive
financial compensation for their injuries or losses from
the perpetrator of the crime. They shall have the right to
address the court regarding the impact which the
perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim. These
rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime, and
they shall have recourse in the law for any denial
thereof. 5 7
55. Id.
56. Minutes of the Rhode Island Constitutional Convention of 1986.
57. Report of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Victims of Crime
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Chairman Allen J. Wiant reported that, of the three proposals
before the Judiciary Committee, Resolution 86-00140 "... steers a
middle course by enumerating substantial rights for victims of
crime, but leaving specific provisions of enforcement to the
General Assembly." 58 That "specific provisions for enforcement"
were left to the General Assembly notwithstanding, it is clear that
the existence of the victim's substantive right to enforce this
constitutional provision in the courts was not meant to be
dependent on any legislative act:
The Committee's consensus is to be sympathetic to the
need for greater protection for victims of crime. The
Committee believes enforcement of victim's present
statutory rights is presently inadequate, and that this
Convention has the opportunity to remedy the injustices
which are occurring under present state law. 59
Comparison with Current Statutory Provisions
"* * * Besides the 14 enumerated (victim's) rights, the
statute contains, as Section 12-28-2, a general statement
of legislative purpose. The text of Resolution 86-140
closely parallels this statement of legislative purpose.
Like Section 12-28-2, Resolution 86-140 would assure
that victims be treated with "dignity, respect and
sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice
process;" that victims "receive financial compensation
whenever possible;" and that victims have the right to
"address the court." However, 86-140 differs from the
victim's right statute by adding the following language:
"These rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime
and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial
thereof. 60
Resolution (86-140) 10 (Judiciary Committee Report), in Journal of the 1986
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 1, No. 8, at 1-2 (May 29, 1986) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter "Report of the Judiciary Committee"].
58. Id.
59. Id. at 4-5.
60. Id.
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Committee Conclusions
The Judiciary Committee concluded that even though the
General Assembly has attempted to address problems in
the treatment victims receive from the criminal justice
system, this effort has been inadequate, The Committee
concluded rights for victims should be made
constitutional, both to make them more enduring, and to
counterbalance the constitutional stature of defendants'
rights. The Committee believes that the lack of
enforcement provisions in the present statute is a major
defect, and it has therefore resolved to mandate
enforceability, while leaving the creation of specific
provisions or mechanisms to the General Assembly.61
The last sentence, which literally declared that these victims'
rights shall be "enforceable in the law," somehow disappeared in
the Committee on Style and Drafting before it was sent back to
the Convention for final approval. It remains unclear exactly
though it has been suggested that the Committee on Style and
Drafting, which left no notes or record of its deliberations, struck
this language "for economy of language" as "unnecessary" and as
sounding "too legislative." 62
Of greatest significance, perhaps, is the document entitled
"EXPLANATION By Convention Legal Services" given to the
delegates upon the reading of the measure to them for final
approval. The final form of this Amendment, as it was submitted
to the convention, approved by the delegates and as it now
appears in the State Constitution, was accompanied by the
following explanation: "[t] his resolution would enumerate basic
rights to be afforded victims of crime and renders those rights
enforceable. This resolution would take effect upon voter
approval. '63
61. Id.
62. Conversation with Kevin Mckenna, 1986 Rhode Island State
Constitutional Convention President, in R.I. (April 1, 1996). This author had
thoroughly researched all available materials from the 1986 constitutional
convention, and had spoken to the Convention President and others in
preparation of his brief to the Supreme Court.
63. See Convention Legal Services, Explanation, in J. Jackson, compiler,
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Confronted with this overwhelming evidence as to the
framers' actual intent, a majority of the Supreme Court found,
nevertheless, that the provision for enforceability was not
mandated by the Convention. The Court begins its full discussion
of this issue in Bandoni by rejecting the notion that the textual
alterations were made for economy of language. 64 "First, we have
great difficulty agreeing that the Committee on Style and Drafting
"altered" the text of Resolution 86-140 but only 'for the economy of
language' . . . whatever the reasoning for the committee's changes
may have been, the rationale of "economy of language" is not
cogently supported. ' 65 The Court then continued:
[I]t is equally apparent that the deletion of the last
sentence expressly providing that crime victims 'shall
have recourse in the law' and substituting for it the
clause 'such other compensation as the state may provide'
is nothing short of a substantive alteration. Thus, it is not
only the deletion of the language providing for 'recourse
in the law for any denial' of rights that is of moment to
our analysis but also the inclusion of the language 'and
shall receive such other compensation as the state may
provide.' 66
Thus, concluded the Court, "[p]ractically speaking, it is
impossible for the Bandonis to 'receive such other compensation as
the state may provide,' as article 1, section 23, contemplates,
because the state itself has not provided for 'such other
compensation."' 67
After reaching its conclusion the majority explained its
rationale for failing to consider the convention documents:
[T]he dissent relies on two textually identical secondary
sources for the proposition that the framers intended to
mandate enforcement "while leaving specific provisions or
mechanisms to the determination of the general assembly
and the courts." However, simply stated, these two
sources incorrectly cite to the Constitutional Convention's
CONVENTION (Providence College 1989).
64. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 591.
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis in original)
67. Id.
2008] BANDONI V. STATE A 10 YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 613
Judiciary Committee report. Indeed, the report only
states its resolve "to mandate enforceability while leaving
the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms to the
General Assembly." Not once throughout its entire report
does the Judiciary Committee ever mention, or even
imply, that the creation of specific provisions or
mechanisms should also be left to the courts. The record
simply does not support this conclusion. 68
The Court also found unlikely and unpersuasive the idea that
the measure was passed "only after the delegates were assured
that the style committee's changes were made only 'for the
economy of language,"' because a "review of the Convention
proceedings finds no such "assurances," promises, or even any
inquiry ... about the modifications ....,,69 Relying on the then
recent First Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in State of Rhode
Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe,70 the court noted that "even
if the delegates did receive explicit assurances as the dissent
suggests, statements by individual legislators or framers are not
to be given talismanic significance." 71 As will be shown this
conclusion by the court is erroneous as is its suggestion that the
state has not provided "such other compensation." In fact such
other compensation is and was provided. Most importantly, funds
for this type of compensation are specifically provided for in the
violent crimes indemnity fund.72
The rationale applied by the majority in order to justify its
declaration that the Convention's mandate of "enforceability" is
itself "unenforceable" is dubious at best. The majority decision
represents no less than a feat of judicial alchemy whereby
precious gold was thereby transformed into worthless lead, with
the phrase "judicial restraint" solemnly murmured like a
68. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 591-92 (internal quotations omitted).
70. 19 F.3d 685, 685 (1st Cir. 1994)
71. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 592.
72. See Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972 (P.L.1972, ch. 254, § 1),
codified at G.L.1956 chapter 25 of title 12 (amended by Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act of 1996 (P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3), codified at G.L.1956 § 12-
25-1.1, §§ 12-25-16 through 12-25-30). The Criminal Injuries Compensation
Act of 1972 was superceded by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of
1996 (P.L.1996, ch. 434) now codified at § 12-25-16 - 12-25-31.
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cabalistic shibboleth to effect the transmutation. The irony of the
Court's reliance on Narragansett Indian Tribe,73 as "particularly
instructive" 74  is immediately apparent. The decision in
Narragansett Indian Tribe is itself a travesty whereby, despite the
explicit assurances given to the Narragansett tribe that they
would retain their sacred and sovereign rights as a tribe, they
were, by judicial fiat, excepted from the norm and denied those
very rights. 75
What's more, the decision overlooks the fact that the changes
were made by the committee on style and drafting. It had no
authority from the convention to alter the substance of any
amendment sent to it, ostensibly for 'style and drafting.' 76 While
the Judiciary Committee expressed its intention that the creation
of "specific provisions or mechanisms" should be left to the
General Assembly, it is urged by the Court that this statement
reflects nothing more than that committee's acknowledgment of
the existence of the Crime Victim's Bill of Rights and its
recognition that the General Assembly is better suited to the task
of setting out the specific mechanisms for the orderly
administration of the system by which victims are notified of their
rights, kept informed about the criminal case and brought into
court to speak. 77 But the majority's holding that the victim of
crime has no actionable claim against the state and/or municipal
officials who have abridged these constitutional rights until the
General Assembly creates such a claim flies in the face of the
framer's obvious intent that such a cause of action should exist by
right of the passage of article I, section 23.
It is certainly within the plenary authority of the General
73. 19 F.3d 685, 685 (1st Cir. 1994)
74. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 592.
75. See generally, Nathaniel T. Haskins, Note, Framing Concurrent
Jurisdiction Issues In The Self-Determination Era: Accepting The First
Circuit's Analysis But Rejecting Its Application to Preserve Tribal
Sovereignty, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 441, 441 (2007-2008) (arguing that the
First Circuit decisions regarding the Narraganset Indian tribe provide a
workable framework to analyze concurrent jurisdiction but that the factors
should be examined with the aim of preserving tribal sovereignty and self
determination).
76. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 624 n.63. (Flanders, J. dissenting).
77. Id. ("Not once throughout its entire report does the Judiciary
Committee ever mention, or even imply, that the creation of specific
provisions or mechanisms should also be left to the courts.")
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Assembly to legislate as to the time and place for bringing such
actions, and to place reasonable limitations on the victim's right to
recover damages against the state; this is also consistent with the
intent of the framers that the creation of "specific provisions or
mechanisms" should be left to the legislature. 78 However, that
the General Assembly has not seen fit to do so does not affect the
self-executing nature of Article I, sec. 23 or the right of the victim
to bring such an action. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has
noted, "Just as the Legislature cannot abridge constitutional
rights by its enactments, it cannot curtail them through its
silence, and the judicial obligation to protect the fundamental
rights of individuals is as old as this country."79
In Phillips v. Youth Development Program, Inc., 459 N.E. 2d.
453, 457 (1983), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
declared that "(A) person whose constitutional rights have been
interfered with may be entitled to judicial relief even in the
absence of a statute providing a procedural vehicle for obtaining
relief."
In Rhode Island our Supreme Court "... has long recognized
that after the adoption of the State Constitution the powers of the
crown and parliament resided in the Legislature, 'less the power
taken therefrom for the federal government and also minus
whatever powers were taken from it by the constitution of the
State."' 80 However, "[u]nlike the Federal Constitution, which
contains grants of enumerated powers, the constitution of this
state sets forth limitations upon what is otherwise plenary power
of the State Legislature."8 1 "More specifically," the court has
recognized "that the General Assembly possesses 'all of the powers
inhering in sovereignty other than those which the constitution
textually commits to other branches of our state government, and
that those that are not so committed * * * are powers reserved to
the General Assembly.' Hence, the General Assembly may exercise
any of such powers, subject only to those limitations expressly or
78. See id. at n.59.
79. King v. So. Jersey Nat'l Bank, 177, 330 A.2d 1, 10 (1974) (citing
Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 175 A. 2d. 639 (1961))
80. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d
550, 553 (R.I. 1984) (quoting Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 31 R.I.
295, 315, 77 A. 145, 153 (1910)).
81. Id.
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impliedly found in the Constitution of the United States (and) of
the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island. ''8 2
The Bandonis' position may be viewed as consistent with this
holding, for certainly, when a constitutional provision is to be
construed, it is within the exclusive power of the courts to do so.
When a constitutional provision is determined to be self-executing,
such a constitutional provision is, or can be said to be an implicit
limitation on the power of the General Assembly to interfere with
the rights conferred thereunder:
"In America, written constitutions, conferring and
dividing the powers of government, and restraining the
actions of those in authority, for the time being, have
been established as securities of public liberty and private
right.
It is true, the whole community may modify the rights
which persons can have in things, or at their pleasure,
abolish them altogether. But when the community allows
the right and declares it to exist, that construction is the
freest and best which forbids the government to abolish
the right, or which restrains the government from
depriving a particular citizen of it." 83
In having set forth specific rights to be afforded the victims of
crime, in having given no direction to the General Assembly, and
consistent with the manifest intent of the framers, this
constitutional provision, article I, section 23 asserts itself as the
supreme law of this state and does, therefore, serve as a solid
basis for an aggrieved crime victim's cause of action.
It is also for the court to examine the text of article I, section
23 in the context of the state constitution as a whole in order to
gauge its intended effect. 84 In so doing it can be seen that there
are no other provisions in the Rhode Island Constitution relating
82. Kennedy v. State of Rhode Island, 654 A.2d 708, 710 (R.I. 1995)
(internal citations omitted)
83. Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276, 293 (N.C.
1992) (citing Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1 (1833)).
84. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("The supreme court shall have final revisory
and appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity .... )
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to crime victims' rights. In Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.3d 924 (Vt.
1995), the Vermont Supreme Court determined the following
provision of its state constitution to be self-executing "That the
people have the right to freedom of speech, and of writing and
publishing their sentiments, concerning the transactions of
governments, and therefore the freedom of the press ought not to
be restrained."8 5
In so doing the court held "[o]ur limited experience with
Article 13 does not inhibit us from finding it to be self-executing.
First, in contrast to Article I, it unequivocally expresses more than
general principles alone. It sets forth a single, specific right of the
people to make themselves heard, a fundamental characteristic of
democratic government."8 6 The court reasoned that:
"[s]ince Article 13 establishes a specific free speech right,
the absence of a legislative directive supports a
conclusion that the provision is self-executing. Indeed, it
would make little sense to have the right to speak out on
government matters depend on legislative enactment.
considering the fundamental nature of citizen input in
our republican form of government. '87
Finally, the court concluded:
"recognizing a self-executing right to free speech and to
seek redress for its infringement comports with the
general constitutional scheme * * * nowhere else in the
Chapter I Declaration of Rights can a general right to
comment on the conduct of government be found. Article
13 creates a specific right to free speech that is crucial to
the operation of government and vital to the effectuation
of other enumerated rights. We hold that the provision is
self-executing and that it may serve as the basis for a
private cause of action against the state."88
The Rhode Island Constitution contains a similar provision in
article I, section 21: "[tjhe citizens have a right in a peaceable
manner to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those
85. VT. CONST. art. 13
86. Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 930 (Vt. 1995).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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invested with the power of government, for redress of grievances,
or for other purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance. No
law abridging the freedom of speech shall be enacted. '8 9
Certainly, the "victims' rights" that are set forth in the Rhode
Island Constitution, Article 1, sec. 23 are consistent with the right
of Rhode Island citizens "to apply to those invested with the
powers of government, for redress of grievances," and comparable
to the "right to comment on the conduct of government" found in
Vermont's constitution.
Of particular interest is the decision of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 S.E.
2d 276 (N.C. 1992), wherein a university faculty member who was
discharged from his position as Dean brought an action for
damages against the state university and university officials
alleging that his discharge violated his right to free speech under
the North Carolina state constitution. 90  Analogizing the
plaintiffs constitutional right to free speech to the state guarantee
of just compensation to individuals whose property is taken by
condemnation, the Court found the free speech provision to be
similarly self-executing:
Our Constitution Article I, section 17 guarantees
payment of compensation for property taken by sovereign
authority * * * A constitutional prohibition against taking
or damaging private property for public use without just
compensation is self-executing and neither requires any
law for its enforcement nor is susceptible of impairment
by legislation. And where the Constitution points out no
remedy and no statute affords an adequate remedy under
a particular fact situation, the common law will furnish
the appropriate action for adequate redress of such
grievance.
Having no other remedy, our common law guarantees
plaintiff a direct action under the State Constitution for
alleged violations of his freedom of speech rights. We
89. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 21
90. Corum, 413 S.E. 2d at 282.
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conclude that plaintiff does have a direct cause of action
under the State Constitution against defendant Durham
in his official capacity for alleged violations of plaintiffs
free speech rights.
The authorities in North Carolina are consistent with the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
decisions of other state supreme courts to the effect that
officials and employees of the State acting in their official
capacity are subject to direct causes of action by plaintiffs
whose constitutional rights have been violated. 91
Like the constitution of North Carolina, our state constitution
also provides for the payment of just compensation for the taking
of private property.92 Would anyone dare deny, in the absence of
a legislative provision for its enforcement, that this provision
would be found reasonably to be self-executing?
Where Article I, Section 23 is consistent with the overall
constitutional scheme, and where there is no other constitutional
provision dealing with the rights of crime victims, the fourth of the
criteria employed by the courts in determining that a
constitutional provision is self-executing, and therefore provides
the basis for a cause of action, has been satisfied.
It has been observed by one prominent author on the subject
of state constitutional rights, that "while most constitutional
Declarations of Rights should indeed be considered self-executing.
• .it does not necessarily follow that a court must provide the
specific remedy of damages, as opposed to injunctive or
declaratory relief, although the court retains the power to do So. ' ' 9 3
91. Id. at 289-90 (internal citations and quotations omitted). For cases
finding a direct cause of action for plaintiffs who have their rights violated by
a state actor, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 388
(1971), Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Ctr., 479 A. 2d. 921, 921 (Md.
1984); Philips v. Youth Development Programs, Inc., 459 N.E. 2d. 453, 453
(Mass 1983); Lloyd v. Stone Harbor, 432 A.2d 572, 572 (N.J 1981); Bagg v.
University of Texas Medical Branch, 726 S.W. 2d. 582, 582 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Servs., Inc.,
408 So. 2d. 567, 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (affd by Schreiner v McKenzie
Tank Lines, Inc. 432 So. 2d. 567, 567 (Fla. 1983)).
92. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
93. Jennifer Friesen, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMs AND DEFENSES 7-14 (1992).
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It is recognized that in the case of certain constitutional
violations, injunctive or declaratory relief may be an appropriate
remedy. The Supreme Court might declare that the defendants
are required to "do their duty" to the plaintiffs and to others
similarly situated, but such a declaration, with nothing more
would be, at best, a salutary gesture. In terms of compelling the
defendants' general compliance with the constitution and statute,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has acknowledged that its
powers are necessarily limited to something other than the
"direct" approach:
(T)he control which the judicial department exercises over
the others, is of a restraining and not a compulsory
power. But this is only practically and not literally so.
We may not enjoin the others from doing an
unconstitutional act, but by refusing to give effect to such
act, or relieving against it, when properly and judicially
applied to for that purpose, we may restrain them. We
cannot restrain * * * issuing the bonds of the state
contrary to law, but when the question is properly before
us, we can declare such bonds void * * * but we have no
power to compel either of the other departments of the
government to perform any duty which the constitution
or the law may impose upon them, no matter how
palpable such duty may be, any more than either of those
departments may compel us to perform our duties. 94
In Bandoni, once their right to address the court in a
meaningful fashion was permanently lost, the only viable remedy
left was to seek monetary damages; that the majority insisted that
the right to other relief had thus been "waived" by the Bandonis
evidences its inability or unwillingness to distinguish the forceful
and logical advocacy of the Bandonis' counsel for practical relief.
As was stated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, "It will be a rare
case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position will be able
to obviate the harm by seeking injunctive relief from any court...
94. Reply of The Supreme Court To A Communication From Certain
Members of The House of Representatives in The General Assembly, 191 A.
259, 272 (1937) (citing Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229, 229 (1857)).
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for people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."95
Likewise, money damages were the only adequate remedy for
the Bandonis. To allow the Bandonis less would be to render the
language of Article I, sec. 23 nugatory and to produce an absurd
result; the Rhode Island Supreme Court has consistently refused
to interpret provisions of the law in such fashion. 96 To borrow
Justice Flanders' apt observation, that the Bandonis' were allowed
no remedy means:
[T]he Bandonis have now been thrice victimized: first, by
the drunk-driving criminal defendant who ran them over
leaving Mr. Bandoni with a crushed leg and a fractured
pelvis; second, by defendant officials who allegedly failed
to provide the Bandonis with their notice and
presentencing-hearing rights before the criminal who
injured them was let off with a no-jail plea bargain; and
third, by a majority of this Court who now say that the
Bandonis have no remedy for the defendant officials'
violation of their constitutional rights. 97
VI. BIVENs ACTION
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, the
United States Supreme Court created a cause of action for
damages against federal agents acting under color of their
authority for having violated the plaintiffs right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. 98 Webster Bivens, the plaintiff,
alleged that these agents, acting without a warrant and without
probable cause, had entered his apartment, had used
unreasonable force in effecting his arrest, had searched the
apartment and had later interrogated him and subjected him to a
visual strip search. 99 He brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the
agents, seeking recovery for humiliation and mental suffering
95. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411.
96. See generally Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire,
637 A.2d 1047 (R.I. 1994); Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633 (R.I. 1987);
Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18 (R.I. 1986).
97. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 604.
98. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
99. Id.
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resulting from their conduct.100 The District Court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds, inter alia that it failed to state facts
making out a cause of action upon which relief could be granted,
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on that
basis. 101
At that point in time, Congress had provided no statutory
remedy against federal law enforcement agents for such a
violation.1 0 2 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment itself
supported the claimed remedy of money damages. 103 The Court
reasoned that damages are the "ordinary remedy" for such
invasions of personal rights, and that it is irrelevant whether the
availability of damages is actually necessary to enforce the Fourth
Amendment:
That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent
upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal
officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition.
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary
remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty,
See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed.
984 (1932); . . .Of course, the Fourth Amendment does
not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an
award of money damages for the consequences of its
violation. But, "it is * * * well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
100. Id. at 389-90.
101. Id. at 397.
102. At the time of the events of which Bivens complained, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (1974), expressly
disallowed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b), "(a)ny
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contractual rights." As the law stands now, the
United States may be held accountable for "assault battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution"
committed by its "investigative or law enforcement officers." 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h) (2000) (as amended). Also, both the United States and its individual
agents, servants and employees may now be held accountable in an action
under the F.T.C.A. "which is brought for a violation of the Constitution [or
statutes] of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679 (b)(2)(A), (B); see also
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
103. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
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may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done." . . . Having concluded that petitioner's complaint
states a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment...
we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money
damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the
agents' violation of the Amendment. ' 0 4
Where the majority of state supreme courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court are willing to embrace their judicial oath of fealty
to their respective constitutions, what is it that causes Rhode
Island to hesitate?
The Supreme Court also noted two possible exceptions to its
general holding in Bivens, but found that neither was applicable
in the case before it; (1) the presence of "special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress[]" and
(2) the presence of an "explicit congressional declaration" that
plaintiff could not recover damages "but must instead be remitted
to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."'10 5
In Davis v. Passman, the Supreme Court applied the Bivens
rationale to an action to obtain a remedy for the violation of an
administrative assistant's Fifth Amendment due process rights
against sexual discrimination when she was discharged from
employment by a member of Congress 10 6:
The court in Davis cited several factors in support of its
decision. First the court determined that a cause of
action for damages was particularly appropriate in the
case at hand for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff sought only
back pay and, therefore, no complicated issues of
valuation and causation would arise; and (2) equitable
relief, such as reinstatement, would be unavailing
because the defendant Congressman was no longer in
office. Id. at 245, 99 S.Ct. at 2277. Second, although the
fact that the defendant had been a member of Congress
was a potential "special [factor] counseling hesitation,"
that factor was overridden by the principle that all
persons, including federal officials, were subject to federal
104. Id. at 395-97.
105. Id. at 396, 397.
106. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245-48 (1979).
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law. Id. at 246, 99 S.Ct. at 2277. Third, the court in
Davis noted the absence of an express congressional
prohibition of a damages action for alleged violations of
the [F]ifth [A]mendment's due process guarantee. Id. at
246-7, 99 S.Ct. at 2277-78.107
In Carlson v. Green, the Court held that the availability of
damages from the United States government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act did not preclude a Bivens action against
individual prison officials where it was alleged that they had
violated the plaintiffs Eighth Amendment protection against cruel
and unusual punishment.1 0 8 The Court reasoned that the Bivens
action against the individual federal officials would be a more
effective specific deterrent in that situation than the
corresponding Federal Tort Claim action against the United
States. 10 9 Thus, with these two decisions a third factor,
inadequacy or absence (adequacy or presence) of an alternative
remedy fell into the Bivens reasoning.
Soon thereafter, however, the Court appears to have placed
less emphasis on the "adequacy" of potential alternative remedies.
In Bush v. Lucas, the Supreme Court declined to allow a federal
employee a damages cause of action against his employer for an
alleged violation of the employee's First Amendment rights. 110
The Court found that civil services damages were available
assuming that "civil service remedies were not as effective as an
individual damages remedy and did not fully compensate [Bush]
for the harm he suffered." 111 Another factor considered by the
court in Bush, was that, in the court's estimation, Congress is
better suited to create new remedies. 112 Along these same lines,
in Chappel v. Wallace, the Court refused to allow enlisted military
personnel a damages action for alleged violations of their equal
protection rights perpetrated by their officers. 113 In so doing, the
Court cited several "factors counseling hesitation" such as the
107. Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Town of Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909,
920-21 (Conn. 1993).
108. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-23.
109. Id. at 21.
110. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
111. Id. at 372.
112. Id. at 389.
113. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
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military's unique discipline-based structure, without making
reference, as in the earlier cases, to the adequacy of that
alternative remedy. 1 1 4
"Special factors counseling hesitation" were also cited by the
Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1988), in its
decision to deny a Bivens damages remedy sought by former Social
Security disability benefits recipients against the programs
administrators. These recipients claimed that an eligibility
reevaluation program that resulted in the termination of their
benefits was administered in a way that denied them due
process.11 5 Though their benefits had been restored via the Social
Security appeals process, they sought damages for emotional
distress and the loss of necessities of life:
The Court explained that the exception to Bivens liability
where there are "special factors counselling hesitation" included
''an appropriate judicial deference to indications that
congressional inaction has not been inadvertent."'1 6  After
analyzing the administrative remedies available to recipients, the
Court found that the case was indistinguishable from Bush v.
Lucas. The Court was particularly struck by the fact that
Congress was aware of and agreed with the plaintiffs' claims but
did not create the remedy they sought:
We agree that suffering months of delay in receiving the
income on which one has depended for the very
necessities of life cannot be fully remedied by the "belated
restoration of back benefits." . . . Congress, however, has
addressed the problems created by the state agencies'
wrongful termination of disability benefits. Whether or
not we believe that its response was the best response,
Congress is the body charged with making the inevitable
compromises required in the design of a massive and
complex welfare benefits program... Congress has
discharged that responsibility to the extent that it affects
the case before us, and we see no legal basis that would
114. Id. at 302-04.
115. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 418.
116. Id. at 423 (internal quotations omitted).
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allow us to revise its decision."'117
VII. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, SEC. 874 A
Bivens and those cases which followed, above-cited, may
provide a ready reference point from which to begin an analysis of
state constitutional rights, and the holdings therein may prove to
be the source of persuasive authority. Nonetheless, it is not
contended that federal doctrine can, or should be lifted wholesale
and applied to state constitutional tort cases:
[S]tate courts should not borrow or copy federal remedial
rules merely for the sake of uniformity, at the expense of
independent state policy. State courts enforcing state
laws are not in the same position as the Supreme Court
when it applies [42 U.S.C.][§] 1983. Obviously, they are
not limited by questions of Congressional intent. Second,
they are not constrained by the policies of federalism.
State judges, unlike federal ones, interpret rights for
their own state alone. They need not labor under the
cautionary influences,, which do affect the Supreme
Court, of the need to make nationally uniform rules,
which bind the officials of another sovereign. 118
It should also be recognized that in 1971 the Bivens court
looked obviously not only to its own precedent, but also to the
state courts and the body of precedent there-established which
supports the judicial creation of a damages remedy for the
deprivation of rights in the absence of legislative action. The
common law doctrine is expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Sec. 874(A) which recites as follows:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by
proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not
provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if
it determines that the remedy is appropriate in
furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed
to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an
injured member of the class a right of action, using a
117. Shields, 658 A.2d at 931-2 (quoting Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 428-29).
118. Friesen, supra note 93, at 7-7.
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suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action
analogous to an existing tort action. 119
The reporter for the Second Restatement used the words
"legislative provision" in Sec. 874 A to describe the duty-creating
element of this tort, but, as "comment a" to the section explains,
"legislative provision" includes constitutional provisions as well as
statutes, ordinances, and administrative agency regulations. As
the comment also notes, the legislative branch can establish,
modify, or abolish remedies for torts. Section 874 A speaks to the
judiciary's power to do so when the legislature has been silent.
Judicial opinions refer to this common law doctrine either as the
"implied cause of action" or the "statutory tort." It is probably
more accurate to say that the court "affords" a cause of action for
the enforcement of a duty rather than "implies" one. 120
Finally, it must be remembered that there is no corresponding
"victims' rights" amendment to the United States Constitution;
moreover, none of the state cases encountered by the author
during his preparation of this article deals specifically with the
constitutional rights of a victim of crime. One supposes these
rights are no more nor less important or worthy of consideration
than other fundamental rights as are set forth in the federal
constitution and those of the several states; the analysis employed
by the majority in Bandoni betrays a peculiar and most unseemly
lack of sensitivity to those affected by the criminal acts of others,
and summarily relegates this relatively new and important
constitutional amendment to the judicial scrap heap. In terms of
the Supreme Court's deference to the General Assembly, one calls
to mind the words of Hamlet in the scene where he exhorted his
mother, the Queen, to abandon his uncle's bed: "Assume a virtue,
if you have it not. That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat,
[o]f habits devil, is angel yet in this[.]" 121
VIII. CONCLUSION
More is the pity that the length of this article is necessarily
limited by the spatial constraints inherent to any law review
119. Id. at 7-14 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §874A (1979)).
120. Id. at 7-15.
121. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK ACT 3, SC. 4.
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article. Consider that the briefs alone in Bandoni, all masterfully
and painstakingly written, totaled in excess of two hundred fifty
pages, and that the decision and dissent themselves totaled over
one hundred ten pages, prompting one beleaguered supreme court
clerk charged with preparing photocopies to remark that it
appears to be the longest decision in Rhode Island Supreme Court
history. However, sheer volume notwithstanding the decision is
important, at least to those concerned not only with the plight of
crime victims, but in a larger sense with the proper role of the
state Supreme Court as the guardian of cherished constitutional
rights. This article cannot begin thoroughly to exhaust the
myriad issues raised by the parties and addressed by the Court.
This writing is not designed to ferment rancor nor, certainly, is it
intended to insult the earnest efforts of the parties' counsel or
those members of the Supreme Court who presided over the
appeal. Rather, it is an appeal to those who love the State
Constitution and the precepts of justice and fair play and it is
hoped that it might inspire law students, advocates, legislators
and judges alike to re-examine this troubling decision.
On May 4, 1776 the colony of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations threw off the yoke of British repression represented
by George III. Seventy and some-odd-years later the State of
Rhode Island adopted its Constitution. It amazes one to think in
this day and age that that which was wrestled from George III is
now by judicial custom and tradition periodically handed back to
his predecessor, Charles II, by right of his colonial charter,
whenever the state constitution appears not to address a given
issue. Rhode Island rejected the monarch and the British
Parliament, and rightfully so. To hold that such a fractious and
generally pernicious body as the General Assembly should retain
such imperial, and sometimes oppressive plenary power is itself
an insult to that cherished document, the Rhode Island
Constitution, and to its framers, past and present.
Presumably, the passage of the Separation of Powers
Amendment will go a long way towards preventing problems such
as those presented in Bandoni by more clearly defining the role of
each of Rhode Island's three independent branches of government
and also limiting that which has traditionally been called the
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plenary power of the general assembly. 122 The full effect of this
amendment remains to be seen. However, it is not contended that
the separation of powers implies any delegation of new powers to
the supreme court; rather it is an exhortation to the court to act
with strength and courage in exercising the full extent of those
powers that it retained since the adoption of the state
constitution. 123
The only solution proposed by this author is that Article I,
Section 23 be revisited and placed back before the electorate unto
the restoration of the language so callously stricken by the
Committee on Style and Drafting in 1986, i.e., that "(t)hese rights
shall be enforceable by the victims of crime, and they shall have
recourse in the law for any denial thereof."1 24  In light of the
opinion in Bandoni, an express provision for monetary damages
should be inserted. What's more the award of damages in such an
action should be left solely to the discretion of the judge and jury
and be unaffected by any sort of limitation otherwise applicable to
tort claims.
One might suggest that the passage of a statute by the
general assembly would effectively cure the defects brought to
light by this article. Yet such an approach is far too precarious
effectively to protect the constitutional rights of Rhode Islands'
citizens. Indeed the framers drafted the Crime Victims Rights
Amendment specifically to ensure that these rights should be
constitutionally protected against the vulgarities and shifting
tides of politics.
Ubi jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right there is a
122. R.I. CONST. art. 9, § 5 provides:
The governor shall, by and with the advice and consent of the senate,
appoint all officers of the state whose appointment is not herein
otherwise provided for and all members of any board, commission or
other state or quasi-public entity which exercises executive power
under the laws of this state; but the general assembly may by law
vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they deem proper,
in the governor, or within their respective departments in the other
general officers, the judiciary or in the heads of departments.
123. There have, in recent years, been encouraging signs that this is
beginning to occur. See, e.g., In re Request for Advisory Opinion from House
of Representatives (Coastal Resources Management Council) 961 A.2d 930,
930 (R.I. 2008)
124. Report of the Judiciary Committee at 1-2.
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remedy. Where "the system" may have failed Robert and Lorraine
Bandoni in this instance there is always, as the state motto
exclaims, "Hope." It is only through the efforts of those who
practice law, and those who aspire to this noble and wonderful
profession, or to the role of legislator or judge, that errors
impeding the cause of justice may be identified and corrected, and
that the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island may grow with
the times consistent with the will and the aspirations of those by
whom its provisions have been lovingly enacted and carefully
revised over the years.
